Wednesday, April 12, 2006

Imminent Decline of Empire?

ZNet | Foreign Policy

Imminent Decline of Empire?

by Ramzy Baroud; April 12, 2006

The miscalculated policies of the US administration in the Middle East are quickly depleting the country’s ability to sustain its once unchallenged global position. Winds of change are blowing everywhere, and there is little that Washington’s ideologues can do to stop it.

The above claim is increasingly finding its way into the realm of mainstream thinking, despite all attempts to mute or relegate its import. A recent speech by US Republican congressman and chairman of the House of international relations committee, Henry Hyde was the focal point of analysis by Martin Jacques in The Guardian. "Our power has the grave liability of rendering our theories about the world immune from failure. But by becoming deaf to easily discerned warning signs, we may ignore long-term costs that result from our actions and dismiss reverses that should lead to a re-examination of our goals and means," Hyde said.

In his poignant analysis — decoding Hyde’s deliberately implicit thoughts — Jacques argued, "The Bush administration stands guilty of an extraordinary act of imperial overreach which has left the US more internationally isolated than ever before, seriously stretched financially, and guilty of neglect in east Asia and elsewhere."

Ironically, the invasion of Iraq with its "thousands of tactical" mistakes — as recently admitted by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice — was meant to solidify and ensure the US’ post Cold-War global dominance. According to Jacques, as inferred from Hyde’s notable speech, "It may well prove to be a harbinger of its decline." It can also be argued that the US adventurism in Iraq has provided the coveted opportunity to other countries to further their national and regional interests without the constant fear of US reprisals.

In a recent interview, MIT professor Noam Chomsky, known for his sharp criticism of US foreign policy particularity in Indochina, Central and Latin America, delineated a new global political reality that is being forged as the US stubbornly insists on fighting a lost battle in Iraq. "What’s happening is something completely new in the history of the hemisphere. Since the Spanish conquest, the countries of Latin America have been pretty much separated from one another and oriented towards the imperial power. For the first time, they are beginning to integrate and in quite a few different ways."

That integration is evident, according to Chomsky, not only by examining the rise of the Left in these countries and the almost immediate alliances — economic cooperation, for example — that these popular governments have achieved. There is a simultaneous rise of the political relevance of the indigenous Indian population in Bolivia, and the opportunities it represents to the Indian population of Ecuador and Peru. Moreover, there is a noteworthy South-South integration that is already breaking regional boundaries and significantly undermining the overpowering grip of the IMF, which has played the infamous role of the unfair middleman between the rich and hapless poor.

China and India, on the other hand, continue to achieve astounding economic growth with China’s economic might and relevance to soon surpass that of the US. In fact, there is an intense diplomatic clash underway between the US and China, since the latter has dared to violate the understanding of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which gave the US alone the right to manage its Latin American domains. For the first time, says a BBC analysis, a foreign country has challenged American influence in the region, and successfully so. Indeed, China is upgrading its economic relations with Brazil — both increasingly formidable economic powers — in ways that will eventually help Brazil break away from a domineering US hold.

These are all part of the "warning signs" to which Hyde was refereeing in his speech. While there are indications that Washington is finally waking up to this grim reality, which it has helped create, there are no signs whatsoever that a fundamental change of course in US foreign policy in the Middle East is taking place: the destructive war in Iraq rages on; the self-inflicting damage of unconditionally backing Israel in its endless colonial ambitions perpetuates; and the same detrimental policy line used with Iraq is employed, almost identically with Iran. US policy planners are as ever insistent on following the same destructive course that has compromised their nation’s global standing.

Instead of paying attention to these woes, the Bush administration is trying to recover some of its Southeast Asia losses by signing a nuclear treaty with India, an action that reeks of double standards and miscalculations. The administration has also lifted the ban on sales of lethal arms to Indonesia in recognition of its "unique strategic role in Southeast Asia," despite protests from human rights groups.

Despite Bush’s recent ‘historic’ trip to India and other top officials’ hasty attempts to reassert America’s global dominance, there should be no illusions that the US’ chief foreign policy debacle starts and ends with the Middle East — especially its ‘special’ relationship with Israel. While the latter has served the role of the client state since its establishment on ethnically cleansed Palestinian territories, this relationship was significantly altered in recent years, with the pro-Israeli lobby taking centre stage, not simply by influencing US foreign policy toward Israel, but eventually by directing it altogether in the region.

The rise of the neoconservatives helped create the false impression that the US and Israeli policies are one and the same, including their mutual interests in maintaining Israel’s military "edge" over its neighbors, which eventually led to the invasion of Iraq. While the neocons are washing their hands of any responsibility in the Middle East impasse, the Bush administration’s arrogance is stopping it from immediately withdrawing its troops from Iraq and reassessing its relationship with Israel.

The world is changing, yet the US government refuses to abandon its old ways: militaristic, self-defeating and overbearing. Indeed, the US must remold, not only its policies in the Middle East, but also its hegemonic policies throughout the world. For once, the US administration needs to tap into its sense of reason, and discern the "warning signs", that should lead to "the re-examination of [its] goals and means." A first step is to bring the troops home, and with them the entire doctrine that unrestrained violence and perpetual wars can further the cause of an already distrusted superpower.

-Veteran Arab American journalist Ramzy Baroud teaches mass communication at Australia’s Curtin University of Technology, Malaysia Campus. His most recent book, Writings on the Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle has been published by Pluto Press, London.


Wednesday, April 05, 2006

The War and the Economy

Interview with Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz


"The War Is Bad for the Economy"

Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, 63, discusses the true $1 trillion cost of the Iraq conflict, its impact on the oil market and the questions of whether the West can afford to impose sanctions on Iran.

Escalating costs of war: A U.S. soldier runs for cover in the northern Iraq town of Tal Afar, September 2005.
REUTERS
Escalating costs of war: A U.S. soldier runs for cover in the northern Iraq town of Tal Afar, September 2005.
SPIEGEL: Professor Stiglitz, at the beginning of the Iraq war, the United States administration was hoping to almost break even in terms of the costs ...

Stiglitz: ... they truly believed the Iraqi people could use their oil revenues to pay for reconstruction.

SPIEGEL: And now you are estimating the cost of war at levels between $1 trillion and $2 trillion. How do you explain this difference?

Stiglitz: First, the war was much more difficult than President Bush and his government expected. They thought they were going to walk in, everybody would say thank you, and they would set up a democratic government and leave. Now that this war is lasting so much longer, they constantly have to adapt their budget. It rose from $50 billion to $250 billion. Today, the Congressional Budget Office talks about $500 billion or more for this adventure.

SPIEGEL: That's still by far lower than your own calculations.

Stiglitz: The reported numbers do not even include the full budgetary costs to the government. And the budgetary costs are but a fraction of the costs to the economy as a whole. And compare this to Gulf War number one, where America almost made a profit!

SPIEGEL: Because Germany paid for it?

Stiglitz: Because Germans paid, because everybody paid. We got our allies to pay full price for used equipment, and we got to refurbish our military. This time, most of the other countries were not willing to do so again.

SPIEGEL: Did Bush just miscalculate, or was he misleading the public about the true costs of war?

Stiglitz: I think it was both. He wanted to believe it was not going to be expensive, he wanted to believe it would be easy. But there's also enormous evidence now that information channels into the White House were distorted. Bush wanted only certain information, and that's mostly what they supplied him with. Larry Lindsey ...

SPIEGEL: ... the White House's former top economic adviser ...

Stiglitz: ... gave -- back in 2002 -- a number of up to $200 billion. I think that was the most accurate inside information at the time. He was dismissed. They didn't want to hear it.

SPIEGEL: In the US, the financial costs of war are seldom discussed. It used to be considered a sacrifice to achieve common goals. Why is it different today?

Stiglitz: This is not like a world war where you're attacked. We were attacked in Pearl Harbor, we had to respond. This time, we had a choice, we had to decide how and who we are going to attack ...

SPIEGEL: ... and if you can afford it.

Stiglitz: Well, we can afford it, that's not the issue. The issue is: $1 trillion or $2 trillion is a lot of money. If our objective is to have stability in the Middle East, secure oil, or extend democracy, you can do a lot of democracy buying for this sum. To put it in context: The whole world spends $50 billion a year on foreign aid. So what we're talking about is multiplying the foreign aid budget 20-fold. Wouldn't you say this could do more for peace and stability and security?

Prof Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize Laureate.
Jürgen Frank
Prof Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize Laureate.
SPIEGEL: Bush would argue it's worth spending that much to decrease the probability of a major terrorist attack on the US.

Stiglitz: Nobody takes that seriously. Instead, most people think the Iraq war has increased the probability of an attack. However, it's difficult to put this aspect into financial terms.

SPIEGEL: How did you calculate the costs of the war?

Stiglitz: The official figures are only the tip of an enormous iceberg. For instance, one of the costs of the war is that soldiers today get very seriously injured but stay alive, and we can keep them alive but at an enormous price.

SPIEGEL: Is this the biggest item in your calculations?

Stiglitz: It's very important. The Bush administration has been doing everything it can to hide the huge number of returning veterans who are severely wounded -- 17,000 so far including roughly 20 percent with serious brain and head injuries. Even the estimate of $500 billion ignores the lifetime disability and healthcare costs that taxpayers will have to spend for years to come. And the administration isn't even generous with veterans, widows and their kids.

SPIEGEL: What does that mean?

Stiglitz: If you're injured in an automobile accident, and you sue the driver, you get much more for your injury than if you're fighting for your country. There's a double standard here. If you happen to put your life at risk fighting for your country, you get a little. If you walk across the street and get injured, you get a lot more. Similarly, payments for a dead soldier amount to only $500,000, which is far less than standard estimates of the lifetime economic cost of a death. This statistical value of a life in the US amounts to circa $6.5 million.

SPIEGEL: How much will a severely brain-damaged soldier cost the US government?

Stiglitz: My moderate estimate is about $4 million. For this group alone there will be a total cost of $35 billion that nobody is talking about. But look at the broader picture: The Veterans Administration originally projected that roughly 23,000 veterans returning from Iraq would seek medical care last year. But in June 2005, it revised this number to an estimated 103,000. No wonder the Veterans Administration had to appeal Congress for emergency funding of $1.5 billion last year.

Graphic: The Costs of the Iraq War
DER SPIEGEL
Graphic: The Costs of the Iraq War
SPIEGEL: If this is a $1 trillion war, why couldn't the US provide its soldiers with safer body armor and better protected vehicles?

STIGLITZ: Obviously, the US can afford to pay for body armor. Rumsfeld, our Secretary of Defense, said you have to fight with the armor you have, but that's unconscionable. The military is focusing only on the short run costs. If they don't provide appropriate body armor, they save some money today, but the healthcare cost is going to be the future for some other president down the line. I view that as both fiscally and morally irresponsible.

SPIEGEL: This war could have been both safer for the troops and cheaper for the country?

Stiglitz: Exactly.

SPIEGEL: Is war no longer affordable even for countries as rich as the United States?

Stiglitz: You have to remember we are an economy of $13 trillion a year. The issue is not whether you can afford it but whether this is the way you want to spend your money. In using the limited resources that we have for fighting this war, we have less resources to do other things. You saw on your TV what happened in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The Reserves or National Guard are usually the people we use for those national emergencies. They weren't here, they were over in Iraq, and so we were less protected.

SPIEGEL: Before the invasion of Iraq, the US administration said the best way to keep oil prices in check is a short and successful war. A barrel was at $25 at that time, and now it's over $60. What of this increase is due to Iraq?

Stiglitz: In our analysis about the cost of war, we only assumed a modest $5 to $10 caused by the war. We wanted to keep our study conservative, so no one would dispute our numbers, and no one did. But I believe that's a vast underestimation of the true cost.

SPIEGEL: But why? China and India are increasing their demand, real global growth has been going on. This is driving the prices.

Stiglitz: When demand rises so does supply -- that's how markets usually work. Now we're seeing that demand for oil is rising but we're not getting a commensurate increase in supply. And there's a simple answer, it's Iraq. But it's not just because it production has been down.

SPIEGEL: Why else?

Stiglitz: The Middle East is the lowest cost producer in the world. They can produce oil for $10, $15 or $20 a barrel. Now we have the technology to produce oil elsewhere for $35 to $45. But who wants to develop fields or invest in new technologies elsewhere if they know that in five years' time, the Middle East may be supplying oil at previous prices?

SPIEGEL: In other words, were peace and stability re-established in the Middle East, the oil price would be back to maybe $25, despite the huge global hunger for energy?

Stiglitz: Yes. By the way that's the price level oil traders were speculating on in futures trading before the outbreak of war.

SPIEGEL: There should be huge economic pressure on Bush to end this conflict.

Stiglitz: The only people benefiting in this war are Bush's friends in the oil industry. He has done the American economy and the global economy an enormous disfavor, but his Texan friends couldn't be happier. The price of oil is up, and they make money when the price of oil goes up. Their profits are at record levels.

SPIEGEL: You don't like this president very much.

Stiglitz: Oh, it's nothing personal. It's all about his politics.

SPIEGEL: There is an old saying: War is good for the economy.

Stiglitz: Listen, World War II was really unusual, because America was in the Great Depression before. So the war did help the US economy to get securely out of this decline. This time, the war is bad for the economy in both the short and long run. We could have spent trillions in research or education instead. This would have led to future productivity increases.

SPIEGEL: So is the economical mess of the Iraq war even bigger than the political?

Stiglitz: Well, we are so rich, we are able to withstand even this level. Crowding out other investments, weakening the economy in the future, that's not a crisis yet. But it's an erosion. It becomes an issue for our legislators. And don't forget the serious issues of nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea. We used up our ability to deal with something serious by dealing with something that was less serious.

SPIEGEL: What's your economic view on Iran?

Stiglitz: We are helping the people that Bush says are evil. Teheran couldn't be happier about the high oil prices resulting from the Iraq war.

SPIEGEL: If the UN Security Council votes for sanctions over Iran and its oil exports, what would that mean for the world economy?

Stiglitz: It would mean an enormous disruption, as oil prices might rise over $100. You can increase the price from $25 to $40, and people can absorb it. If the price rises above $60, they become unhappy. They start to adjust, they move to smaller cars, drive a little bit less. At $100 or $120, there are major changes in lifestyle. The sales of cars will plummet. Poor people will be facing real problems of heat versus food.

SPIEGEL: The world can't afford sanctions at this time?

Stiglitz: We talk about not allowing their officials to get visas to visit our countries.

SPIEGEL: That's not a harsh measure.

Stiglitz: It's no sanction. So the answer is, yes, we have no effective sanctions.

SPIEGEL: Professor Stiglitz, thank you for this interview.

Interview conducted by Frank Hornig and Georg Mascolo.




© SPIEGEL ONLINE 2006
All Rights Reserved
Reproduction only allowed with the permission of SPIEGELnet GmbH



Friday, March 24, 2006

Not a Drop to Drink

In Parched Latin American Countries,
the Battle over Water is Ready to Explode

By Kelly Hearn

American Prospect
February 25, 2005

In El Alto, Bolivia, a populist drumbeat is being heard -- and it's about water. Protesters say a foreign-owned company contracted to manage the city’s water system has failed to get enough of it to El Alto’s poor. When protesters shut down a major road, Bolivia’s president, Carlos Mesa, axed the state contract with the company, which is part-owned by the gigantic French water corporation Suez.

It's not the first time Bolivian protesters have sent a huge multinational firm packing. In 1997, the World Bank forced Bolivia to privatize its water system as a loan contingent. In 2000, residents of the city Cochabamba took to the streets when connection fees rose steeply after a subsidiary of California-based construction giant Bechtel took over. The Bolivian government violently suppressed the protests, and the events were documented and spread across the Internet by Jim Shultz, founder of the Democracy Project, a Bolivian-based watchdog group. In the end, Bechtel pulled out and sued the Bolivian government for $25 million under a bilateral investment treaty. The case is now pending. Water privatization has hit bumps in Argentina, too, where President Nestor Kirchner has been sparring with Aguas Argentinas, also a subsidiary of Suez, over claims that the company has not lived up to its infrastructure investment promises.

As global freshwater shortages loom, water has become a political pulse point in Latin America, which in recent years has increasingly backed away from the more conservative policies of the 1990s and elected left-leaning governments. The World Bank estimates that 76 million of the 510 million people in the Caribbean and Latin America do not have access to safe drinking water. Bank officials embrace privatization as a panacea, and multinational corporations are happy to get closer to Latin America’s vast water supply (when global water shortages really hit, it’s nice to be a supplier of last resort).

Here in South America, shoddy delivery and treatment systems, poor oversight, and wasteful cultures of use present their own problems for water. But the great sucking noise will come from trade law, from developing countries signing their water resources over to private companies via deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), deals that treat water as “goods” and “investments.” The International Forum on Globalization, based in San Francisco, has mapped how noxious provisions from NAFTA, now incorporated into CAFTA, will favor multinational corporations and spell disaster for developing countries.

Consider NAFTA’s Chapter 11, the investor-state provision. Locked into CAFTA and favored for inclusion in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the provision lets corporations (investors) sue governments (states) if they feel they have lost out on economic opportunity. Translation: If any country, state, or province lets only domestic companies export water, corporations in the other signatory countries could sue for financial compensation for “discrimination.” And if a government attempted to ban bulk water exports, says Antonia Juhasz, an International Forum on Globalization analyst, the very act would automatically turn water into a tradable commodity, which in turn would trigger the CAFTA or, if it’s resuscitated, the FTAA. Under such a scheme, a lot of Bechtels could sue a lot of Bolivias for money that might otherwise be spent on lifting people from poverty.

Huhasz, in an IFG study, says other trade provisions favored by the U.S. right could spell problems for water-rich developing nations that sign up for regional trade agreements: The idea of “proportional sharing,” embedded in NAFTA´s article 315, prohibits signatories from restricting resource exports, cutting off a country´s ability to curtail water exports. Another is a WTO principle that any new laws, including environmental laws, must be “least trade restrictive,” a provision the IFG report says has been the death of many environmental laws. These are concepts that vastly expand the rights of multinational investors trying to get close to Latin America's water systems and supplies. The legalisms may be lost on most Latin Americans, but the greed behind them certainly is not. Judging from their presence on the Internet, the Cochabamba protests seem, like Kent State or Tiananmen Square, to symbolize greater struggles. More than a rejection of water privatization and commodification, they are an indictment of aggressive, U.S.-backed trade policies, of insatiable First World greed, of the corporate march across civil society.

The Economist, citing World Bank statistics, recently report that privatization in the 1990s expanded the access that Latin Americans have to water by 40 percent to 70 percent. But observers suggest that lower-tech options could come before widespread corporate-favoring privatization contracts. Activists such as Canadian Maude Barlow has suggested radical shifts in watershed management and production, infrastructure repairs, reclamation of outdated water systems, and drip irrigation as opposed to flood irrigation.

Here in South America, the lessons are getting clearer by the protest; the world would do well to study the lessons of Cochabamba and El Alta. Global water shortages, corporate creep, and devastating trade agreements are bringing us fast to a place where, as one water company reportedly described it, water has gone from an endless commodity taken for granted to “a rationed necessity that may be taken by force.”

About the Author: Kelly Hearn is a correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and a former science and technology reporter for United Press International.


More Information on Social and Economic Policy
More Information on Global Public Goods
More Information on International Trade Agreements

British Companies Making a Fortune out of Iraq Conflict - Security Council - Global Policy Forum

British Companies Making a Fortune
out of Iraq Conflict

By Robert Verkaik

Independent
March 13, 2006

A total of 61 British companies are identified as benefiting from at least £1.1bn of contracts and investment in the new Iraq. But that figure is just the tip of the iceberg.

British businesses have profited by at least £1.1bn since coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein three years ago, the first comprehensive investigation into UK corporate investment in Iraq has found. The company roll-call of post-war profiteers includes some of the best known names in Britain's boardrooms as well many who would prefer to remain anonymous. They come from private security services, banks, PR consultancies, urban planning consortiums, oil companies, architects offices and energy advisory bodies.

Among the top earners is the construction firm Amec, which has made an estimated £500m from a series of contracts restoring electrical systems and maintaining power generation facilities during the past two years. Aegis, which provides private security has earned more than £246m from a three-year contract with the Pentagon to co-ordinate military and security companies in Iraq. Erinys, which specialises in the same area, has made more than £86m, a substantial portion from the protection of oilfields.

The evidence of massive investments and the promise of more multimillion-pound profits to come was discovered in a joint investigation by Corporate Watch, an independent watchdog, and The Independent. The findings show how much is stake if Britain were to withdraw military protection from Iraq. British company involvement at the top of Iraq's new political and economic structures means Iraq will be forced to rely on British business for many years to come.

A total of 61 British companies are identified as benefiting from at least £1.1bn of contracts and investment in the new Iraq. But that figure is just the tip of the iceberg; Corporate Watch believes it could be as much as five times higher, because many companies prefer to keep their relationship secret. The waters are further muddied by the Government's refusal to release the names of companies it has helped to win contracts in Iraq.

Many of the companies enjoy long-standing relationships with Labour and now have a financial stake in the reconstruction of Iraq in Britain's image. Of the total profits published in the report, the British taxpayer has had to meet a bill for £78m while the US taxpayer's contribution to UK corporate earnings in Iraq is nearly nine times that. Iraqis themselves have paid British company directors £150m.

The report acknowledges that British business still lags behind the huge profits paid to American companies. But, in two fields, Britain is playing a critical and leading role. The threat from the Iraqi insurgency means British private security companies are in great demand. Corporate Watch estimates there are between 20,000 and 30,000 security personnel working in Iraq, half of whom are employed by companies run by retired senior British officers and at least two former defence ministers.

The biggest British player, Aegis - run by Tim Spicer, the former British army lieutenant colonel who founded the security company Sandline - has a workforce the size of a military division and may rank as the largest corporate military group ever assembled, according to the report. Other private security companies have sprung up overnight to protect British and American civilians. Britain is also playing a leading role in advising on the creation of state institutions and the business of government. PA Consulting, which has also received a contract for advising on the Government's ID cards scheme, worth around £19m, is now a key adviser in Iraq.

Adam Smith International, a body closely linked to the right-wing think-tank used by Margaret Thatcher, has been heavily involved in the foundation of the Iraqi government and continues to influence its newly formed ministries. According to the Tory MP Quentin Davies, who visited Iraq, the advisers are "reordering Iraqi government operations at the most basic level, to help restructure some of the Iraqi ministries, in fact physically restructure them, even suggesting how the minister's office should be laid out".

Another favourite of the Thatcher governments, now involved in Iraq, is Tim Bell, who ran the Tories' election campaigns in 1979, 1983 and 1987. His PR firm Bell-Pottinger has been involved in advising on the 2004 elections and a strategic campaign to promote bigger concepts such as the return of sovereignty, reconstruction, support for the army and police, minority rights and public probity.

Loukas Christodoulou, of Corporate Watch, has been monitoring British business relations with Iraq since the invasion. He says in his conclusion to our joint report: "The presence of these consultants in Iraq is arguably a part of the UK government's policy to push British firms as lead providers of privatisation support. The Department for International Development has positioned itself as a champion of privatisation in developing countries. The central part UK firms are playing in reshaping Iraq's economy and society lays the ground for a shift towards a corporate-dominated economy. This will have repercussions lasting decades."

In five years, the £1.1bn of contracts identified in the report will be dwarfed by what Britain and the US hope to reap from investments. Highly lucrative oil contracts have yet to be handed out.


More Information on Iraq
More Information on Corporate Contracts


For the original Report see Corporate Carveup: British Corporations in Iraq

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/contract/2006/0313britishcompanies.htm

Thursday, March 23, 2006

Patents pending

Patents pending

Writing in Legal Times, Tony Mauro reports on yesterday's Supreme Court arguments over the reaches of U.S. patent law:

"Supreme Court justices appeared reluctant Tuesday to decide a key patent law case in a way that would, as one justice put it, establish 'monopolies in this country beyond belief' over naturally occurring phenomena.

Justice Stephen Breyer expressed that concern during oral arguments in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite, a dispute that tests the scope of patentability. Other justices indicated sympathy with the solicitor general's view that the case should be sent back to lower courts for further review."

An editorial in The New York Times calls the case a reminder that the system has become Patently Ridiculous:

"The Supreme Court now appears ready to weigh in and -- we hope -- restore some sanity to the system. Yesterday the court heard arguments on whether the patent for a blood test for a vitamin deficiency was so broadly construed that it included a natural process of the human body and the idea of how to interpret it. Such a patent could prevent other inventors from developing new and better tests. The court will also hear arguments next week in a case attacking eBay, the global marketplace."

More information on the case is available from the Supreme Court's docket.

March 22, 2006 | Permalink

Lawyers barred from using own names

Lawyers barred from using own names

It is a truism that clients hire lawyers not law firms. But what happens when lawyers and firms stake competing claims in the same name? The federal court in Connecticut recently barred two lawyers from using their own names in the name of their firm. The name of their New London firm, Suisman & Shapiro, formed in 2004, violated the trademark of another, much-older New London firm Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Brennan, Gray & Greenberg, the court said.

The lawyers at the center of the dispute, S. Joel Suisman and Andrew Shapiro, are both former members of the original firm and the sons of its founders. When the younger Suisman left the original firm in 2004 and joined with Shapiro to start the new firm, the original firm sued in federal court alleging violations of federal and state trademark and trade practices laws. In June 2004, U.S. District Judge Janet C. Hall entered a preliminary order against the new firm's use of the name. On Feb. 15, she made that order permanent.

The judge explained:

"A reasonable fact finder could reach no conclusion, on the basis of the undisputed evidence, other than that, in the market for legal services in Connecticut, the mark 'Suisman Shapiro' has become synonymous with, and refers distinctly to, the entity that is the plaintiff law firm. Accordingly, the plaintiff firm has demonstrated that the mark in question has, as a matter of law, acquired secondary meaning and is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act."

A 2004 New York Lawyer report on the preliminary injunction provides more background on the case.

March 22, 2006 | Permalink


Friday, March 17, 2006

Truisms - William Lloyd Garrison - January 8, 1831

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Truisms

William Lloyd Garrison
January 8, 1831

1. All men are born equal, and entitled to protection, excepting those whose skins are black and hair woolly; or, to prevent mistake, excepting Africans, and their descendants.

2. If white men are ignorant and depraved, they ought freely to receive the benefits of education; but if black men are in this condition, common sense dictates that they should be held in bondage, and never instructed.

3. He who steals a sheep, or buys one of a thief, deserves severe punishment. He who steals a negro, or buys him of a kidnapper, is blameless. Why? Because a sheep can be eaten, and a negro cannot; because he has a black fleece, and it a white one; (1) because the law asserts that this distinction is just—and law, we all know, is founded in equity; and because pure benevolence actuates in the one case, and downright villany [sic] in the other.

4. The color of the skin determines whether a man has a soul or not. If white, he has an immortal essence; if black, he is altogether beastly. Mulattoes, however, derive no benefit from this rule.

5. The blacks ought to be held in fetters, because they are too stupid to take care of themselves; at least, we are not so stupid as to suffer them to make the experiment.

6. To kidnap children on the coast of Africa is a horrid crime, deservedly punishable with death; but he who steals them, in this country, as soon as they are born, performs not merely an innocent but a praiseworthy act.

7. In Africa, a man who buys or sells another, is a monster of hell. In America, he is an heir of heaven.

8. A man has a right to heap unbounded execration upon the foreign slave trade, and the abettors thereof; but if he utter a sentiment derogatory to the domestic traffic, or to those who assist in the transportation of victims, he is to be imprisoned for publishing a libel, and sentenced to pay a fine of not less than one thousand dollars.

9. He who calls American slaveholders tyrants, is a fool, a fanatic, or a madman; but if he apologise for monarchical governments, or an hereditary aristocracy, set him down as a tory, and a traitor to his country.

10. There is not the least danger of a rebellion among the slaves; and even if they should revolt en masse, what could they do? Their united physical force would be utterly contemptible.

11. None but fanatics or idiots desire immediate abolition. If the slaves were liberated at once, our throats would be cut, and our houses pillaged and burnt!

12. Our slaves must be educated for freedom. Our slaves must never learn the alphabet, because knowledge would teach them to throw off their yoke.

13. People at the north have no right to alleviate physical suffering, or illumine spiritual darkness, at the south; but they have a right to assist the Greeks, or the Hindoos, or any foreign nation.

14. Were the slaves, goaded to desperation, to rise against their masters, the free states are constitutionally bound to cut their throats! "The receiver is as bad as the thief." The free states receive and consume the productions of slave labor! The District of Columbia is national property: slavery exists in that District! Yet the free states are not involved in the guilt of slavery!

15. A white man, who kills a tyrant, is a hero, and deserves a monument. If a slave kill his master, he is a murderer, and deserves to be burnt.

16. The slaves are kept in bondage for their own good. Liberty is a curse to the free people of color—their condition is worse than that of the slaves! Yet it would be very wicked to bind them with fetters for their good!

17. The slaves are contented and happy. If sometimes they are so ungrateful or deluded as to abscond, it is pure philanthropy that induces their masters to offer a handsome reward for their detection.

18. Blacks have no intellect. The laws, at the south, which forbid their instruction, were not enacted because it was supposed these brutes had brains, or for the sake of compliment, but are owing simply to an itch for superfluous legislation.

19. Slaves are held as property. It is the acme of humanity and justice, therefore, in the laws, to recognise them also as moral agents, and punish them in the most aggravated manner, if they perpetrate a crime; though they cannot read, and have neither seen nor known the laws!

20. It is foolish and cruel for an individual to denounce slavery; because the more he disturbs the security of the masters, the more vindictive will be their conduct toward the slaves. For the same reason, we ought to prefer the products of slave labor to those of free; as the more wealthy masters become, the better they will be enabled to feed and clothe their menials.

21. To deny that a man is a christian or republican, who holds slaves and dooms their children to bondage, is most uncharitable and in-consistent.

22. To say that a clerical slavite is bound to follow his own precepts, or to obey the seventh and tenth commandments, is preposterous.

23. To doubt the religious vitality of a church, which is composed of slaveholders, is the worst species of infidelity.

24. The Africans are our slaves—not because we like to oppress, or to make money unjustly—but because Noah’s curse must be fulfilled, and the scriptures obeyed.


Monday, March 13, 2006

The Socialism of Water

The Socialism of Water
A socialism of water is what we have built in the United States and yet we are unable to recognize it.

Most people in the U.S. value the fact that they have water flowing from their taps but our rulers consider the idea of socialism an evil in itself. Thus nobody even discusses the fact that water is a highly subsidized resource supplied to us by government agencies (or agencies closely connected to the state) at very low cost. Nobody in the elite dares call our water system, a socialist system, because then people might want other kinds of socialism, say, in health care. We in the United States are detached from the history of water. We take it for granted. . We take for granted the large government projects that have given us a system of water socialism, supplying large industrial farms and mega-cities with great supplies of gushing water. The U.S. system of cities would not be able to exist without water socialism.

We also take for granted the "successes" and failures of the urban and industrial revolutions that provided us with our socialism of water.

There are many things, good and bad, that one can say about our unique socialism of water in the U.S. And because I am in favor of libertarian socialism myself I will work against the grain and begin with some of the bad things. Sometimes our system of socialism exhibits all of the qualities of the tragedy of the commons. We waste huge amounts of water. Our system of water consumption often leads to large amounts of water pollution that must be cleaned at the public expense. Some of the largest water projects in the West can largely be seen as a subsidy to big businesses, and these businesses in no way pay their share in taxes to compensate the rest of us. The South and East largely subsidized the West and Southwest in building an infrastructure of water socialism, and this has contributed to a political shift away from Eastern cities and the industrial sector. The West and Southwest call themselves 'rugged individualists and yet their whole way of life is based upon federal water projects. This is rarely if ever acknowledged. The absurdity of our system of water socialism can be seen in a desert city such as Las Vegas, one of the fastest growing cities in the U.S., which is spread across waterless land under a burning sun, with suburban style grasslawns soaking up water at a fast clip, all to support an adult entertainment industry based on gambling. The specific contradiction or the U.S. form of water socialism arises from the fact, that in order for any form of socialism to continue in the U.S. it must largely benefit the rich and powerful. Here is the true tragedy of the commons, but stated in a way that is not usually acknowledged by right-wing economists.

Historically, water socialism in the U.S. arose at times of the revolution of rapid urbanization and later suburbanization. These were also times when groups of elites had to compete with each other for political support from the multitude. The history of water in New York City, and the tremendous system of underground tunnels from upstate reservoirs, is an example of how one elite group opposed to another, competing for middle class and working class support, was able to establish the water infrastructure of an imperial city. It is, by the way, one of those rarely studied facts of history that all great imperial cities have been based on one form or another of collectivization of water. The great water projects in many cases arose in the same way that they did in New York, from elite competition to gain support of the masses. The best example is, of course, Rome during the ancient Republic. But another example is the New Deal attempt to extend New York City type water projects to the whole of the U.S., and to also apply the idea of water socialism to electricity. Most sunbelt rugged individualists, those who hate government intervention, those who think that Federal welfare is evil, would be living without a sure water supply, and without electricity, but for the projects of the federal government that led to a distributed water supply and to rural electrification.

The U.S. system of water socialism, for all of its failings is largely a success. Edmund Wilson, once said that one of the great cultural advances of all times is the American bathroom. I believe this is true. Water socialism makes this great human comfort of indoor plumbing possible. Note that the possibility of indoor plumbing in effect created the modern U.S. real estate industry and thus, indirectly, the modern banking system. It is a simple historical fact that without our system of water socialism the most vibrant aspects of U.S. "capitalism" (so-called), would not exist. Further without water socialism all but the well off people would go through everyday life working and planning to obtain enough water to live.

Given the success (and the reasons for the few failures) of water socialism in the U.S. is it any wonder that most academics who write about politics, economics, and law simply ignore the lessons of the history and administration of water, especially drinking water? They only concentrate on issues of pollution, important issues no doubt, but an issue that leads to skewed conclusions about the tragedy of the commons. In our society, when intellectual elites are confronted with a successful example of socialism they will only concentrate on the tragedy of the commons and never on the success of social planning as opposed to the market..

That is why it was nice to see an attempt to look into the history of water as relates to law. James Saltzman, who from reading his papers I surmise would not agree with my politics, has begun "an ongoing book project on the history of drinking water," a project that should be watched. One of the first entries of this project is called Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water. I recommend this paper.

Below I provide a quote.

Drinking water is most obviously a physical resource, one of the few truly essential requirements for life. Regardless of the god you worship or the color of your skin, if you go without water for three days in an arid environment your life is in danger. And water’s physical characteristics confound easy management. Water is heavy – it is difficult to move uphill. Water is unwieldy – it cannot be packed or contained easily. And drinking water is fragile – it easily becomes contaminated and unfit for consumption. Drinking water is also a cultural resource, of religious significance in many societies. A social resource, access to water reveals much about membership in society. A political resource, the provision of water to citizens can serve important communication purposes. And finally, when scarce, water can become an economic resource.

As the Cochabamba [Bolivia, where a consortium led by Bechtel attempted to privatize water delivery] experience makes clear, managing and mediating these many facets of drinking water is no easy matter. Understanding a society’s ability to provide clean drinking water to its citizens, examining how it recognizes the different natures of this vital resource, provides a unique prism on the society’s organization, equity, and view of itself. In seeking to understand better how societies manage such a critical resource, this article considers three questions.

• How have different societies thought about drinking water?
• How have different societies managed access to drinking water?
• How have these changed over time?



These questions are, of course, interrelated. How we think of water, whether as a sacred gift or a good for sale, both influences and is influenced by how we manage access to drinking water. When management of drinking water fails to reflect popular conceptions and expectations, pressures for transition to a new management regime increase. And, as we saw in Cochabamba, when the new management regime fails to respect popular conceptions and expectations, it will fail.

Asking such questions may seem odd to an American environmental lawyer, for we tend to assume the presence of drinking water and focus on its quality rather than its natures as a resource; we tend to think in terms of quality rather than quantity. There is a vast literature on drinking water treatment, sources of water pollution, and drinking water standards, for example, yet relatively little on how we manage the resource, itself. To be sure, much thought has been dedicated to the problems of groundwater depletion and rivers that no longer run to the sea, but not because of drinking water concerns.

Compared to irrigation water, domestic use is a trickling afterthought. And even within the category of domestic use, much less water is used for drinking than for clothes washing, baths/showers, toilet flushing, or watering the lawn. In many parts of the world and for much of human history, however, drinking water quality has been only one of the basic challenges in managing this vital resource. While not an obvious issue to us in 21st century America, management of drinking water as a resource – who gets it, when they get it, and how much they get – matters a great
deal.


Finally, it must be said that our unique system of water socialism is denied to most people in the world today. There are historical and cultural reasons for this. Some of these reasons are indigenous and some international. Some have to do with the fact that during the period of urbanization, often forced urbanization, these areas of the world were dominated by distant empires. Today neo-liberal economic policies contribute to the failure of governments to build a working water infrastructure. In the great city of Rio de Janeiro for instance there is bottled water for the rich and dirty water for everyone else. As Saltzman states:

The facts of drinking water in the developing world are both straightforward and daunting. Over one billion people do not have access to even a basic water supply. Well over two billion people lack adequate sanitation. As a result, approximately half of the developing world inhabitants suffer from illnesses caused by contaminated water supplies. Many environment ministers consider this the single greatest threat to their people.

The contrast with developing countries could not be starker. Neither water quality nor quantity can be assumed. Because water supply infrastructure is not provided in the poorest urban or in many rural areas, obtaining water is regarded as an individual or domestic responsibility. In contrast to the ease of turning on a faucet, lack of infrastructure means a high labor input as someone from the household (generally women and girls) must collect each day’s water, whether from a communal pond or well, a tanker, or kiosk. Less than half of the population in Africa lives within a 15-minute walk of a safe drinking water source.

I fear with the wearing down of working class solidarity in the U.S. we are heading for this kind of divided economy of water. If water is commodified by "capitalist" standards we will all lose. And this brings us to the fact that our water system is a form of bureaucratic socialism and not a form of democratic and libertarian socialism. Our water system should be a part of our public debate and consciousness and the infrastructure itself should be administered democratically by the workers. Making our system of water consumption and delivery more democratic is a goal that goes along with making all aspect of our society more democratic.


Postscript: Saltzman quotes Scott E. Masten, Prospects for Private Water Provision in Developing Countries: Lessons from 19th- Century America xx (draft),

“The role of waterworks in firefighting was also a major theme. First, water demands for firefighting meant that waterworks had to be much larger than otherwise, raising the fixed costs of water systems…Fire insurance companies as early as 1800 made provision for centralized water systems in their rates… In Houston, pressure for a municipal takeover of the city’s private waterworks erupted in 1886 after a fire destroyed an important cotton seed mill ‘while firemen stood by helplessly because the hydrants were dry.’”


From my knowledge of the class nature of water politics in New York City, I know that the real estate interests were those who were mostly in favor of a system of water management that would provide enough water pressure for firefighting. This was also part of the movement to privatize municipal agencies such as the Police and Fire Departments, both of which were at times "private" and remained, for quite a long time, centers for political power and corruption. Insurance companies and real estate interests realized that it made good economic sense to support great water projects. Such projects expanded their economic base and provided for stable expansion. Free drinking water for the masses and pressurized water supply for real estate stability (and, as a side argument, offering indoor comfort to the rich), was part of urban party politics at the turn of the century. The reason I point to this is that economists rarely pay attention to the fact that developing and maintaining the commons was historically essential to the creation of the possibility of markets, in this case the urban and suburban real estate market. Markets are always created and/or maintained by collective non-market processes and those markets would fall apart otherwise. I cannot think of exceptions.




New York City
4 March 2006


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Fresh Water Science

Conservation Science >
Freshwater Science
Around the world, freshwater species and habitats are among the most endangered. Freshwater conservation planning recognizes the distinct nature of freshwater systems: the importance of dynamic hydrologic processes, of connectivity across multiple dimensions, and of threats that disproportionately affect aquatic systems.

In recognition of this urgent conservation need and special methodological considerations, WWF's Conservation Science Program is devoting increasing effort to freshwater projects at the global, continental, ecoregional and landscape scales.

Quick Links
  • Africa and Madagascar conservation assessment
  • Global lakes and wetlands database (GLWD)
  • Sourcebook (PDF, 7.0 MB)
  • At the global scale, we are completing a delineation of freshwater conservation units for the entire world and synthesizing biodiversity information for each unit. This companion to the Terrestrial Ecoregions of the World endeavor will be complete in 2006. Delineation of freshwater units is driven primarily by fish zoogeography, and freshwater fishes are the first taxonomic group for which we are synthesizing richness and endemism data. In collaboration with the National Geographic Society, freshwater science Fellow Zeb Hogan is undertaking a global assessment of the world's largest freshwater fish species, most of which are imperiled. We have also recently completed a new global lakes and wetlands database (GLWD), in partnership with the Center for Environmental Systems Research, University of Kassel, Germany. This database, which is freely available, will help to improve global assessments. Finally, we are in the process of completing a new global hydrographic dataset and toolkit, HydroSHEDS (Hydrological data and maps based on SHuttle Elevation Derivatives at multiple Scales), which will allow conservation planners and managers around the world to do basic hydrological mapping and analyses.

    Our global project builds on several continental scale assessments. We have completed conservation assessments for Latin America and the Caribbean (PDF, 590k), North America, and Africa and Madagascar. These assessments contain detailed analyses of both biodiversity and threats, and they identify priority ecoregions based on the integration of these indexes. The ecoregion maps for Latin America and the Caribbean and North America are being updated as part of our global project.

    At the ecoregional scale, we have provided technical support to the development of multiple biodiversity visions. Freshwater ecoregional efforts include work in the Amazon, Guianas, Congo, Mekong, and Niger basins (PDF, 204k), the Southeast United States, the Chihuahuan Desert, and Lake Malawi (PDF, 3.0 MB). We have combined lessons derived from many of these projects into a sourcebook (PDF, 7.0 MB) for those undertaking similar efforts in the future.

    Because many of the world's most important freshwater systems are poorly known scientifically, much of our work involves developing tools and approaches for addressing those data gaps. For instance, we used global hydrological models to develop scenarios for the impacts of climate change on river flows in western Mongolia, to help inform decisions about future hydropower development. We have also coupled HydroSHEDS data with hydrologic models to delineate and classify sub-watersheds in the southwest Amazon headwaters, the Guianas, and the Mekong River basin.

    Effective conservation planning around the world will require addressing key scientific questions. We have outlined these questions for freshwater systems in a paper that was published in the October 2002 issue of Conservation Biology. Working with partners, we have also addressed the effects of tilapia aquaculture on native freshwater biodiversity, the ways that conservation biology may inform integrated basin management, prospects for monitoring freshwater systems towards the 2010 targets, and the problem of overfishing in freshwaters. Please see the Conservation Science Program's publications page for a complete list of these and other papers.

    The Conservation Science Program works in collaboration with WWF's Global Freshwater Programme for healthy freshwater systems. We also work with numerous partner organizations and researchers around the world. For more information about our freshwater science work, please send an inquiry to cspinfo@wwfus.org.

    View the online presentation, "Ecoregion Conservation for Freshwater Systems: An Approach for Biodiversity Conservation at Large Scales".


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    Sunday, March 12, 2006

    What is it like to be a bat? by Thomas Nagel

    What is it like to be a bat?

    Thomas Nagel

    [From The Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4 (October 1974): 435-50.]


    Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction.1 But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.

    Every reductionist has his favorite analogy from modern science. It is most unlikely that any of these unrelated examples of successful reduction will shed light on the relation of mind to brain. But philosophers share the general human weakness for explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and well understood, though entirely different. This has led to the acceptance of implausible accounts of the mental largely because they would permit familiar kinds of reduction. I shall try to explain why the usual examples do not help us to understand the relation between mind and body—why, indeed, we have at present no conception of what an explanation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be. Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. The most important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do not even try to explain it. And careful examination will show that no currently available concept of reduction is applicable to it. Perhaps a new theoretical form can be devised for the purpose, but such a solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future.

    Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. There may be further implications about the form of the experience; there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is to be that organism—something it is like for the organism.

    We may call this the subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing.2 It is not analyzable in terms of the causal role of experiences in relation to typical human behavior—for similar reasons.3 I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character. For there is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible when no attempt is made to account for consciousness can be extended to include consciousness. With out some idea, therefore, of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot know what is required of physicalist theory.

    While an account of the physical basis of mind must explain many things, this appears to be the most difficult. It is impossible to exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical reduction of it—namely, by explaining them as effects on the minds of human observers.4 If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.

    Let me first try to state the issue somewhat more fully than by referring to the relation between the subjective and the objective, or between the pour-soi and the en-soi. This is far from easy. Facts about what it is like to be an X are very peculiar, so peculiar that some may be inclined to doubt their reality, or the significance of claims about them. To illustrate the connection between subjectivity and a point of view, and to make evident the importance of subjective features, it will help to explore the matter in relation to an example that brings out clearly the divergence between the two types of conception, subjective and objective.

    I assume we all believe that bats have experience. After all, they are mammals, and there is no more doubt that they have experience than that mice or pigeons or whales have experience. I have chosen bats instead of wasps or flounders because if one travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience there at all. Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid (though it certainly could be raised with other species). Even without the benefit of philosophical reflection, anyone who has spent some time in an enclosed space with an excited bat knows what it is to encounter a fundamentally alien form of life.

    I have said that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something that it is like to be a bat. Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera, to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly modulated, high-frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case,5 and if not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion.

    Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task. I cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by imagining segments gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining some combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications.

    To the extent that I could look and behave like a wasp or a bat without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would not be anything like the experiences of those animals. On the other hand, it is doubtful that any meaning can be attached to the supposition that I should possess the internal neurophysiological constitution of a bat. Even if I could by gradual degrees be transformed into a bat, nothing in my present constitution enables me to imagine what the experiences of such a future stage of myself thus metamorphosed would be like. The best evidence would come from the experiences of bats, if we only knew what they were like.

    So if extrapolation from our own case is involved in the idea of what it is like to be a bat, the extrapolation must be incompletable. We cannot form more than a schematic conception of what it is like. For example, we may ascribe general types of experience on the basis of the animal's structure and behavior. Thus we describe bat sonar as a form of three-dimensional forward perception; we believe that bats feel some versions of pain, fear, hunger, and lust, and that they have other, more familiar types of perception besides sonar. But we believe that these experiences also have in each case a specific subjective character, which it is beyond our ability to conceive. And if there's conscious life elsewhere in the universe, it is likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential terms available to us.6 (The problem is not confined to exotic cases, however, for it exists between one person and another. The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him. This does not prevent us each from believing that the other's experience has such a subjective character.)

    If anyone is inclined to deny that we can believe in the existence of facts like this whose exact nature we cannot possibly conceive, he should reflect that in contemplating the bats we are in much the same position that intelligent bats or Martians7 would occupy if they tried to form a conception of what it was like to be us. The structure of their own minds might make it impossible for them to succeed, but we know they would be wrong to conclude that there is not anything precise that it is like to be us: that only certain general types of mental state could be ascribed to us (perhaps perception and appetite would be concepts common to us both; perhaps not). We know they would be wrong to draw such a skeptical conclusion because we know what it is like to be us. And we know that while it includes an enormous amount of variation and complexity, and while we do not possess the vocabulary to describe it adequately, its subjective character is highly specific, and in some respects describable in terms that can be understood only by creatures like us. The fact that we cannot expect ever to accommodate in our language a detailed description of Martian or bat phenomenology should not lead us to dismiss as meaningless the claim that bats and Martians have experiences fully comparable in richness of detail to our own. It would be fine if someone were to develop concepts and a theory that enabled us to think about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied to us by the limits of our nature. And to deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest form of cognitive dissonance.

    This brings us to the edge of a topic that requires much more discussion than I can give it here: namely, the relation between facts on the one hand and conceptual schemes or systems of representation on the other. My realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts. Certainly it is possible for a human being to believe that there are facts which humans never will possess the requisite concepts to represent or comprehend. Indeed, it would be foolish to doubt this, given the finiteness of humanity's expectations. After all there would have been transfinite numbers even if everyone had been wiped out by the Black Death before Cantor discovered them. But one might also believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted for ever—simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. (After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.) Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.

    I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the topic before us (namely, the mind-body problem) is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.

    I am not adverting here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view—to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experiencer is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise. In our own case we occupy the relevant point of view, but we will have as much difficulty understanding our own experience properly if we approach it from another point of view as we would if we tried to understand the experience of another species without taking up its point of view.8

    This bears directly on the mind-body problem. For if the facts of experience—facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism—are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. The latter is a domain of objective facts par excellence—the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems. There are no comparable imaginative obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge about bat neurophysiology by human scientists, and intelligent bats or Martians might learn more about the human brain than we ever will.

    This is not by itself an argument against reduction. A Martian scientist with no understanding of visual perception could understand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena, though he would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things occupy in our phenomenal world. The objective nature of the things picked out by these concepts could be apprehended by him because, although the concepts themselves are connected with a particular point of view and a particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not: they are observable-from the point of view but external to it; hence they can be comprehended from other points of view also, either by the same organisms or by others. Lightning has an objective character that is not exhausted by its visual appearance, and this can be investigated by a Martian without vision. To be precise, it has a more objective character than is revealed in its visual appearance. In speaking of the move from subjective to objective characterization, I wish to remain noncommittal about the existence of an end point, the completely objective intrinsic nature of the thing, which one might or might not be able to reach. It may be more accurate to think of objectivity as a direction in which the understanding can travel. And in understanding a phenomenon like lightning, it is legitimate to go as far away as one can from a strictly human viewpoint.9

    In the case of experience, on the other hand, the connection with a particular point of view seems much closer. It is difficult to understand what could be meant by the objective character of an experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends it. After all, what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat? But if experience does not have, in addition to its subjective character, an objective nature that can be apprehended from many different points of view, then how can it be supposed that a Martian investigating my brain might be observing physical processes which were my mental processes (as he might observe physical processes which were bolts of lightning), only from a different point of view? How, for that matter, could a human physiologist observe them from another point of view?10

    We appear to be faced with a general difficulty about psychophysical reduction. In other areas the process of reduction is a move in the direction of greater objectivity, toward a more, accurate view of the real nature of things. This is accomplished by reducing our dependence on individual or species-specific points of view toward the object of investigation. We describe it not in terms of the impressions it makes on our senses, but in terms of its more general effects and of properties detectable by means other than the human senses. The less it depends on a specifically human viewpoint, the more objective is our description. It is possible to follow this path because although the concepts and ideas we employ in thinking about the external world are initially applied from a point of view that involves our perceptual apparatus, they are used by us to refer to things beyond themselves—toward which we have the phenomenal point of view. Therefore we can abandon it in favor of another, and still be thinking about the same things.

    Experience itself however, does not seem to fit the pattern. The idea of moving from appearance to reality seems to make no sense here. What is the analogue in this case to pursuing a more objective understanding of the same phenomena by abandoning the initial subjective viewpoint toward them in favour of another that is more objective but concerns the same thing? Certainly it appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of human experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us. If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it.

    In a sense, the seeds of this objection to the reducibility of experience are already detectable in successful cases of reduction; for in discovering sound to be, in reality, a wave phenomenon in air or other media, we leave behind one viewpoint to take up another, and the auditory, human or animal viewpoint that we leave behind remains unreduced. Members of radically different species may both understand the same physical events in objective terms, and this does not require that they understand the phenomenal forms in which those events appear to the senses of members of the other species. Thus it is a condition of their referring to a common reality that their more particular viewpoints are not part of the common reality that they both apprehend. The reduction can succeed only if the species-specific viewpoint is omitted from what is to be reduced.

    But while we are right to leave this point of view aside in seeking a fuller understanding of the external world, we cannot ignore it permanently, since it is the essence of the internal world, and not merely a point of view on it. Most of the neobehaviorism of recent philosophical psychology results from the effort to substitute an objective concept of mind for the real thing, in order to have nothing left over which cannot be reduced. If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be done. The problem is unique. If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, intrinsically,11 to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case remains a mystery.

    What moral should be drawn from these reflections, and what should be done next? It would be a mistake to conclude that physicalism must be false. Nothing is proved by the inadequacy of physicalist hypotheses that assume a faulty objective analysis of mind. It would be truer to say that physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true. Perhaps it will be thought unreasonable to require such a conception as a condition of understanding. After all, it might be said, the meaning of physicalism is clear enough: mental states are states of the body; mental events are physical events. We do not know which physical states and events they are, but that should not prevent us from understanding the hypothesis. What could be clearer than the words 'is' and 'are'?

    But I believe it is precisely this apparent clarity of the word 'is' that is deceptive. Usually, when we are told that X is Y we know how it is supposed to be true, but that depends on a conceptual or theoretical background and is not conveyed by the 'is' alone. We know how both "X" and "Y " refer, and the kinds of things to which they refer, and we have a rough idea how the two referential paths might converge on a single thing, be it an object, a person, a process, an event or whatever. But when the two terms of the identification are very disparate it may not be so clear how it could be true. We may not have even a rough idea of how the two referential paths could converge, or what kind of things they might converge on, and a theoretical framework may have to be supplied to enable us to understand this. Without the framework, an air of mysticism surrounds the identification.

    This explains the magical flavor of popular presentations of fundamental scientific discoveries, given out as propositions to which one must subscribe without really understanding them. For example, people are now told at an early age that all matter is really energy. But despite the fact that -'they know what 'is' means, most of them never form a conception of what makes this claim true, because they lack the theoretical background.

    At the present time the status of physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might be true. In order to understand the hypothesis that a mental event is a physical event, we require more than an understanding of the word 'is'. The idea of how a mental and a physical term might refer to the same thing is lacking, and the usual analogies with theoretical identification in other fields fail to supply it. They fail because if we construe the reference of mental terms to physical events on the usual model, we either get a reappearance of separate subjective events as the effects through which mental reference to physical events is secured, or else we get a false account of how mental terms refer (for example, a causal behaviorist one).

    Strangely enough, we may have evidence for the truth of something we cannot really understand. Suppose a caterpillar is locked in a sterile safe by someone unfamiliar with insect metamorphosis, and weeks later the safe is reopened, revealing a butterfly. If the person knows that the safe has been shut the whole time, he has reason to believe that the butterfly is or was once the caterpillar, without having any idea in what sense this might be so. (One possibility is that the caterpillar contained a tiny winged parasite that devoured it and grew into the butterfly.)

    It is conceivable that we are in such a position with regard to physicalism. Donald Davidson has argued that if mental events have physical causes and effects, they must have physical descriptions. He holds that we have reason to believe this even though we do not—and in fact could not—have a general psychophysical theory.12 His argument applies to intentional mental events, but I think we also have some reason to believe that sensations are physical processes, without being in a position to understand how. Davidson's position is that certain physical events have irreducibly mental properties, and perhaps some view describable in this way is correct. But nothing of which we can now form a conception corresponds to it; nor have we any idea what a theory would be like that enabled us to conceive of it.13

    Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences' having an objective character at all. Does it make sense, in other words, to ask what my experiences are really like, as opposed to how they appear to me? We cannot genuinely understand the hypothesis that their nature is captured in a physical description unless we understand the more fundamental idea that they have an objective nature (or that objective processes can have a subjective nature).14

    I should like to close with a speculative proposal. It may be possible to approach the gap between subjective and objective from another direction. Setting aside temporarily the relation between the mind and the brain, we can pursue a more objective understanding of the mental in its own right. At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective character of experience without relying on the imagination—without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new method—an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination. Though presumably it would not capture everything, its goal would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences.

    We would have to develop such a phenomenology to describe the sonar experiences of bats; but it would also be possible to begin with humans. One might try, for example, to develop concepts that could be used to explain to a person blind from birth what it was like to see. One would reach a blank wall eventually, but it should be possible to devise a method of expressing in objective terms much more than we can at present, and with much greater precision. The loose intermodal analogies—for example, 'Red is like the sound of a trumpet'—which crop up in discussions of this subject are of little use. That should be clear to anyone who has both heard a trumpet and seen red. But structural features of perception might be more accessible to objective description, even though something would be left out. And concepts alternative to those we learn in the first person may enable us to arrive at a kind of understanding even of our own experience which is denied us by the very ease of description and lack of distance that subjective concepts afford.

    Apart from its own interest, a phenomenology that is in this sense objective may permit questions about the physically basis of experience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of subjective experience that admitted this kind of objective description might be better candidates for objective explanations of a more familiar sort. But whether or not this guess is correct, it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it.

    NOTES:

    1 Examples are J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); David K. Lewis, 'An Argument for the Identity Theory', Journal of Philosophy, LXIII (1966), reprinted with addenda in David M. Rosenthal, Materialism & the Mind-Body Problem, (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Hilary Putnam, 'Psychological Predicates', in Art, Mind, & Religion, ed. W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), reprinted in Materialism, ed. Rosenthal, as 'The Nature of Mental States'; D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); D. C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969). I have expressed earlier doubts in 'Armstrong on the Mind', Philosophical Review, LXXIX (1970), 394-403; a review of Dennett, Journal of Philosophy, LXIX (1972); and chapter 11 above. See also Saul Kripke, 'Naming and Necessity'. in Semantics of Natural Language, ed. D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972), esp. pp. 334-42; and M. T. Thornton, 'Ostensive Terms and Materialism', The Monist, LVI (1972), 193-214.

    2 Perhaps there could not actually be such robots. Perhaps anything complex enough to behave like a person would have experiences. But that, if true, is a fact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept of experience.

    3 It is not equivalent to that about which we are incorrigible, both because we are not incorrigible about experience and because experience is present in animals lacking language and thought, who have no beliefs at all about their experiences.

    4 Cf. Richard Rorty, 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories', Review of Metaphysics, XIX (1965), esp. 37-8.

    5 By 'our own case' I do not mean just 'my own case', but rather the mentalistic ideas that we apply unproblematically to ourselves and other human beings.

    6 Therefore the analogical form of the English expression 'what it is like' is misleading. It does not mean 'what (in our experience) it resembles', but rather 'how it is for the subject himself'.

    7 Any intelligent extraterrestrial beings totally different from us.

    8 It may be easier than I suppose to transcend inter-species barriers with the aid of the imagination. For example, blind people are able to detect objects near them by a form of sonar, using vocal clicks or taps of a cane. Perhaps if one knew what that was like, one could by extension imagine roughly what it was like to possess the much more refined sonar of a bat. The distance between oneself and other persons and other species can fall anywhere on a continuum. Even for other persons the understanding of what it is like to be them is only partial, and when one moves to species very different from oneself, a lesser degree of partial understanding may still be available. The imagination is remarkably flexible. My point, however, is not that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. I am not raising that epistemological problem. My point is rather that even to form a conception of what it is like to be a bat (and a fortiori to know what it is like to be a bat) one must take up the bat's point of view. If one can take it up roughly, or partially, then one's conception will also be rough or partial. Or so it seems in our present state of understanding.

    9 The problem I am going to raise can therefore be posed even if the distinction between more subjective and more objective descriptions or viewpoints can itself be made only within a larger human point of view. I do not accept this kind of conceptual relativism, but it need not be refuted to make the point that psychophysical reduction cannot be accommodated by the subjective-to-objective model from other cases.

    10 The problem is not just that when I look at the Mona Lisa, my visual experience has a certain quality, no trace of which is to be found by someone looking into my brain. For even if he did observe there a tiny image of the Mona Lisa, he would have no reason to identify it with the experience.

    11 The relation would therefore not be a contingent one, like that of a cause and its distinct effect. It would be necessarily true that a physical state felt a certain way. Saul Kripke in Semantics of Natural Language, (ed. Davidson and Harman) argues that causal behaviorist and related analyses of the mental fail because they construe, e.g., 'pain' as a merely contingent name of pains. The subjective character of an experience ('its immediate phenomenolocal quality' Kripke calls it (p. 340)) is the essential property left out by such analyses, and the one in virtue of which it is, necessarily, the experience it is. My view is closely related to his. Like Kripke, I find the hypothesis that a certain brain state should necessarily have a certain subjective character incomprehensible without further explanation. No such explanation emerges from theories which view the mind-brain relation as contingent, but perhaps there are other alternatives, not yet discovered.

    A theory that explained how the mind-brain relation was necessary would still leave us with Kripke's problem of explaining why it nevertheless appears contingent. That difficulty seems to me surmountable, in the following way. We may imagine something by representing it to ourselves either perceptually, sympathetically, or symbolically. I shall not try to say how symbolic imagination works, but part of what happens in the other two cases is this. To imagine something perceptually, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the state we would be in if we perceived it. To imagine something sympathetically, we put ourselves in a conscious state resembling the thing itself. (This method can be used only to imagine mental events and stares—our own or another's.) When we try to imagine a mental state occurring without its associated brain state, we first sympathetically imagine the occurrence of the mental state: that is, we put ourselves into a state that resembles it mentally. At the same time, we attempt perceptually to imagine the nonoccurrence of the associated physical state, by putting ourselves into another state unconnected with the first; one resembling that which we would be in if we perceived the nonoccurrence of the physical state. Where the imagination of physical features is perceptual and the imagination of mental features is sympathetic, it appears to us that we can imagine any experience occurring without its associated brain state, and vice versa. The relation between them will appear contingent even if it is necessary, because of the independence of the disparate types of imagination.

    (Solipsism incidentally, results if one misinterprets sympathetic imagination as if it worked like perceptual imagination: it then seems impossible to imagine any experience that is not one's own.)

    12 See 'Mental Events' in Experience and Theory, ed. Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970); though I do not understand the argument against psychophysical laws.

    13 Similar remarks apply to my paper 'Physicalism', Philosophical Review, LXXIV (1965), 339-56, reprinted with postscript in Modern Materialism, ed. John O'Connor (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969).

    14 This question also lies at the heart of the problem of other minds, whose close connection with the mind-body problem is often overlooked. If one understood how subjective experience could have an objective nature, one would understand the existence of subjects other than oneself.

    15 I have not defined the term 'physical'. Obviously it does not apply just to what can be described by the concepts of contemporary physics, since we expect further developments. Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental phenomena from eventually being recognized as physical in their own right. But whatever else may be said of the physical, it has to be objective. So if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character—whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly in either category.